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Carleton University, Ottawa, CanadaSummary.— Local conditions in developing countries have long played a part in determining whether their small-scale firms can benefit
from deepening their participation in global value chains (GVCs). Institutional theory allows us to characterize these local conditions not
simply as particularistic oddities but rather as elements of an institutional matrix that affects the livelihoods of chain participants. How-
ever, the institutional dimension of GVC analysis has been traditionally neglected in the literature, to the detriment of our understanding
of the impacts of upgrading in GVCs. This study aims to remedy this failure by illustrating how institutional context mediates between
value chain upgrading and the livelihoods of chain participants. It particular, it seeks to elucidate how value chain upgrading spurs a
process of change in the institutions that govern the livelihoods of suppliers in developing countries. This examination sheds light on
the more general question of how value chain upgrading sometimes helps, but sometimes hurts, the welfare of chain participants. This
theoretical contribution to the value chain literature is based upon an institutional analysis of primary qualitative data from more than
80 small-scale tea farmers in Nepal, some of whom had upgraded from conventional to organically certified production. Our study finds
that value chain upgrading launches a process of institutional change that can be summarized in a general typology. The typology high-
lights how rules, strategies, organizations, and informal norms affect whether a given upgrading intervention yields livelihood benefits in
a particular place. Upgrading can yield positive impacts in chain-linked livelihood dimensions, such as price, and yet induce negative
changes in other livelihood dimensions, such as risk, and thereby yield overall adverse livelihood implications, in a process we dub ‘‘im-
miserizing upgrading”. These findings contribute to advancing the conceptual literature on global value chains (GVCs) by suggesting a
general typology for cycles of institutional change that influence livelihood outcomes. The typology provides a framework to analyze
such processes that is also of use to development practitioners seeking to understand the conditions under which upgrading worsens
or improves the welfare of value chain participants. The research findings provide an interesting window into how certification schemes
interact with the daily lives of the rural poor.
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Under what conditions do small-scale firms in developing
countries benefit from deepening their participation in global
value chains? The diversity of evidence brought to bear in
the academic and policy debate on the matter suggests that
the impact of participation in global value chains is by no
means uniform (cf. McCullough, Pingali, & Stamoulis,
2008). Suppliers in developing countries have adopted upgrad-
ing strategies in an effort to improve their position in the chain
and capture more value added in production. Although it is
often assumed that upgrading strategies will be advantageous
to those who adopt them, evidence suggests that this is not
always the case. Studies indicate that upgrading can adversely
affect the welfare of chain participants (Ponte & Ewert, 2009;
Rossi, 2013). More generally, upgrading efforts interact with
local institutions and strategies in a process that generates
heterogeneous welfare outcomes for chain participants. A pro-
duct upgrade that improves quality and prices, for example,
interacts with local labor institutions and internationally
defined product quality rules, which in turn affect profitability.
Owing to the weak conceptualization of institutions in the
global value chain framework, however, we know relatively
little about the interplay between institutions and value chain
upgrading (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009). The importance of the
institutional context has been acknowledged in the literature,
where it is considered the fourth pillar of analysis (Gereffi,
1999), yet theoretical and empirical work on institutions in
value chains has been neglected. Indeed, on the basis of their
review of the literature, Neilson and Pritchard (2009) argue
that institutional analysis within the global value chain frame-
work ‘‘tends to appear wooden and simplistic” (p. 47).
The research presented here aims to remedy this failure by52examining how institutional context mediates between value
chain upgrading and the livelihoods of chain participants.
A growing literature has highlighted how local conditions
influence whether value chain upgrading impacts positively
or negatively on the welfare of upstream suppliers (Mitchell
& Coles, 2011; Ponte & Ewert, 2009; Rossi, 2013). Institu-
tional theory allows us to characterize local conditions not
simply as particularistic oddities but rather as elements of an
institutional matrix that constrains and facilitates economic
interactions (North, 1990). This paper contributes to the liter-
ature on institutions in value chains by building a stylized
typology of how value chain upgrading changes the local insti-
tutions that govern the livelihoods of suppliers in developing
countries. This theoretical contribution to the value chain lit-
erature is based upon an institutional analysis of dozens of
field interviews with producers whose livelihoods have been
affected by upgrading. When a buyer decides to upgrade to
higher-quality strands of the value chain, for example, this
can affect their rules for purchase and payment frequency,
which in turn affects the sale options of suppliers. Institutional
change can thus have knock-on effects on livelihoods, such as
through wastage of suppliers’ agricultural product or unem-
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may be so negative as to generate an overall negative liveli-
hood impact from the upgrading effort in a process this paper
dubs ‘‘immiserizing upgrading”. When livelihoods are com-
promised, household welfare can bear the brunt of the impact;
as such, the rest of this paper uses a livelihood perspective to
understand welfare. The typology provides a framework to
analyze such processes that is also of use to development prac-
titioners seeking to understand the conditions under which
upgrading worsens or improves the welfare of value chain par-
ticipants.
The analysis is developed by examining how insights from
economic theories of institutional change resonate in a value
chain case study of small-scale tea farmers in Nepal. Findings
suggest that upgrading sparks a cycle of change. Firstly, it
induces changes in the institutions that govern the livelihoods
of upgrading farmers. This in turn encourages the crafting of
new livelihood strategies, the formation of organizations to
support these strategies, and shifts in informal norms. This
transformation affects whether value chain participants benefit
or lose from upgrading. Yet it also generates new opportuni-
ties that can lead to another cycle of upgrading and institu-
tional change. Analysis thus indicates that suppliers’
institutional context, and their strategies, influence commodity
system dynamics.
The following section develops the conceptual framework
for the paper through an exploration of the relevant literature
on value chain upgrading and institutional change. Sec-
tion three provides a background on the case study of the
tea value chain in Nepal and methodology. In section four,
institutional data from the case study is analyzed, discussing
the process of change in Nepal. Section five derives a general
typology for institutional change in value chains and analyzes.
The last section concludes and draws policy lessons.2. VALUE CHAIN UPGRADING
AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE THEORY
Shifts in the governance of global trade flows are reconfigur-
ing the livelihoods of small-scale producers in the global south.
In addition to producing for local markets, or for wholesale
markets, small-scale firms face opportunities to participate in
coordinated international supply chains. The Global Value
Chain (GVC) literature (Gereffi, 1994, 1999; Gereffi,
Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005) has studied these chains, trac-
ing the interactions between actors along a product’s trajec-
tory ‘‘from its conception and design, through production,
retailing and final consumption” (Leslie & Reimer, 1999, p.
404). According to Gereffi’s classic framework (1994), chains
are characterized by how their input–ouput relationships are
structured across space, as well as how they are governed. Sub-
sequent scholarship in the GVC tradition has focused on gov-
ernance, and particularly how product and information
exchange is coordinated by lead firms. Gereffi et al. (2005)
identify a range of types of chain coordination, with uncoordi-
nated spot market-type exchange on one end and on the other
the very tight, vertically integrated exchange that occurs
within a corporation. Between these two extremes are forms
of coordination that address the particular informational
demands and supplier capacity of the chain. When the chain
involves the exchange of highly complex and easily codified
information from buyers to weak suppliers, then the authors
suggest that a ‘‘captive” form of coordination will emerge.
In captive chains, suppliers are dependent on buyers, who in
turn monitor their suppliers intensely.Recent value chain literature has highlighted that there may
be synergies between the type of chain coordination and the
tendency of chain actors to adopt strategies to improve their
position in the chain. These strategies, which are known as
‘‘upgrading” efforts in the global value chain literature, are ini-
tiated because a rent has been identified, or because actors see
an opportunity to mitigate risks or avoid volatile international
prices (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2001). In their study of aquacul-
ture in Asia, for example, Ponte, Kelling, Jespersen, and
Kruijssen (2014) find that captive coordination tends to
encourage process upgrading, wherein inputs are more effi-
ciently transformed into outputs, as well as product upgrad-
ing, when agents shift to a new, higher value thread of the
value chain. Other types of upgrading, including to new roles
(functional) and products (inter-chain), are found in other
types of chains. Although early scholarship focused on
upgrading to improve market power and thereby access higher
incomes, subsequent work has highlighted how it can also
alter the control and decision-making power producers have
over the terms and conditions of their participation in value
chains (KIT, Faida MaLi, & IIRR, 2006; Riisgaard, 2009)
and the rights and entitlements of workers (‘‘social upgrad-
ing”) (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011; Rossi, 2013).
Impacts of upgrading range from income to poverty
(Mitchell & Coles, 2011), gender (Laven & Verhart, 2011),
and livelihoods (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009), and not always
for the better. Downgrading, such as moving to a downstream
function or less demanding thread of the chain, could actually
be advantageous (Ponte & Ewert, 2009). Adopting different
managerial models, supplying different end markets, improv-
ing efficiency, and meeting social and environmental standards
could also yield benefits (Ponte et al., 2014). Upgrading could
also worsen welfare, including by worsening some livelihood
aspects while improving others; as noted in the discussion later
in the text, these strategies can be described as ‘‘immiserizing”
upgrading efforts.
When firms undergo product upgrading, they can find them-
selves in tightly coordinated chains driven by strong lead
firms. Lead firms in value chains use governance mechanisms
such as production standards to exert control over the trans-
mission of knowledge, information, product, and finance to
and from suppliers. Yet at each node of the value chain, stan-
dards, as institutions for coordination in value chains (Bingen
& Busch, 2006; Busch, 2011; Henson & Humphrey, 2010),
intersect with local economic institutions. As such, upgrading,
governance, and institutions have to be seen together in order
to understand welfare impacts (Ponte & Sturgeon, 2014).
Unfortunately, the institutional dimension of analysis has
been neglected in the value chain literature, obscuring our
view of this interaction (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009; Ponte
et al., 2014). Indeed, one researcher has suggested that Gereffi
saw the institutional framework surrounding the value chain
as the ‘‘conditions under which control over market access
and information are exercised on a global plane” (Gibbon,
2001, p. 347). Conceiving of the institutional framework in
which the value chain is embedded in this passive fashion is
problematic. 1 A richer conceptualization of institutions is
offered by Global Production Network (GPN) theory.
According to GPN thought, each stage of the production pro-
cess is embedded in a web of networks and institutions across
the social, economic, political, and environmental spheres. In
this vision, commodity systems are ‘‘multi-dimensional,
multi-layered lattices of economic activity” (Henderson,
Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung 2002, p. 442). Other conceptual
approaches to commodity production similarly deploy non-
linear multi-dimensional systems frameworks (Lazzarini,
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Pritchard, 2009). This research yields insights into how to con-
ceptualize the embeddedness of commodity chains within soci-
ety.
Notwithstanding their spatial sophistication, these bodies of
thought fall short when it comes to analyzing how chains
change over time. GPN theory moves beyond a value chain
theory’s exclusive focus on the chain by highlighting how a
broad range of place-based networks and institutions interact
with chain governance over time (Henderson et al., 2002;
Yeung & Coe, 2015). Similarly to GVC research, however,
GPN research tends to focus on market power; chain transfor-
mation is initiated to obtain control over the chain and the
economic rents that accrue to dominant chain actors. Changes
in chain governance then interact with local institutions (Coe,
Hess, Yeung, Dicken, & Henderson, 2004; Henderson et al.,
2002; Levy, 2008; Neilson & Pritchard, 2009). Extensions of
GPN and GVC research have investigated the nature of such
interactions in more detail. The interface between the chain
and social institutions can be analyzed as a site of political
contestation, including over the hegemonic ideology and gov-
ernance structures of globalization (Levy, 2008). Other litera-
ture takes up the question of how changes in chain governance
play out at a local level. Neilson and Pritchard (2009), for
example, suggest that such changes incite ‘‘struggles” in partic-
ularly locations. During these struggles, local institutions
‘‘configure”, ‘‘sculpt” and ‘‘negotiate” outcomes in the chain.
The chain thereby ‘‘coexists in an iterative nexus” with its
institutional context in which both are ‘‘co-produced and in
a state of perpetual dynamic transformation” (pp. 8–10, 56).
Economic theories of institutional change can shed light on
these dynamics. Virtually all institutional economics scholars
see change as an evolutionary process. The process starts with
a trigger from within the economic system, and continues as
agents envisage an alteration to an existing institution or a dif-
ferent institution entirely (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002).
Agents mobilize via organizations (Olson, 1965) to bring the
new institution into being, and competition of some sort
ensues among old and new institutions for adoption. Old insti-
tutions are destroyed or decayed, while new ones are adopted.
Stability ensues—until the cycle begins again.
Different schools of thought diverge when it comes to ana-
lyzing the process in more depth. For example, several New
Institutional Economics scholars assume that the change pro-
cess is determinate and that optimal institutions will necessar-
ily emerge that are efficient and maximize welfare (Williamson,
2000). This would imply that upgrading necessarily improves
outcomes for participants. In what we will call scenario one,
they depict institutional change operating like a Darwinian
evolutionary process, wherein exogenous parameter change
in relative factor prices, demand, technologies (Hayami &
Ruttan, 1971; North & Thomas, 1973) or preferences
(North, 1990) changes economic conditions. A variety of dif-
ferent rule sets are proposed to address the new conditions,
and these institutions compete among one another to get the
most economic agents using their set of rules. This competi-
tion among institutions will induce convergence around the
lowest transaction cost institution (Alchian, 1950). The ques-
tion then becomes how the initial exogenous change was insti-
gated; in the context of value chain analysis, this begs the
question of what makes suppliers decide to upgrade.
Endogenous theories of institutional change do not have
this problem. Instead, they highlight how change is instigated
from within the system. In contrast to the instrumental and
determinate approach described above, in this approach insti-
tutional change arises in a complex environment whereininstitutions and individuals co-evolve by influencing one
another. Multiple equilibria, some of which may be inefficient
or indeed harmful, are possible in these theories. 2
Such endogenous theories generate three additional institu-
tional change scenarios. In scenario two, the ongoing opera-
tion of institutions over time changes parameters which are
not essential to the rules of the game, but nonetheless affect
the payoffs experienced by the actors. As these ‘‘quasi-
parameters” shift over time—one can imagine, for example,
changes in a region’s overall level of technical knowledge or
soil organic content over time—they can lead to institutional
disequilibrium and affect the benefits from institutional
change, triggering action (Greif & Laitin, 2004; Canales,
2010). In the third scenario institutional participants seek to
marginally change the rules through institutional additions
and alterations (North, 1990). This predicts that change is
likely to be incremental. In the fourth scenario, institutional
entrepreneurs set out strategically to change institutions. Since
agents are shaped by existing institutions, however, they must
step outside their constraints to change things. Seo and Creed
(2002) suggest that for this to happen, agents must become
aware that institutional contradictions exist, which depends
on how profound the contradictions are and mechanisms of
communication, and they must also see that they stand to ben-
efit by rectifying these contradictions.
Interactions between upgrading and institutions are relevant
to development particularly insofar as they affect the welfare
of upstream producers. In this study, welfare outcomes are
understood from a livelihoods perspective. Livelihoods have
been defined by Ellis (2000) as ‘‘a combination of assets
(. . .), activities and access to these (. . .) that together determine
the living gained by the individual or household” (p. 10).
Unlike other welfare measures used in value chain upgrading
studies, a livelihood framework captures all the data about
the well-being components that matter to the research subject.
This includes income as well as income fluctuations, assets that
insure against risk, and expectations for the future.
How does value chain upgrading interact with institutions
to affect the livelihoods of chain participants? This broad ques-
tion is taken up empirically through a case study of the Nepali
tea value chain.3. THE NEPALI TEA VALUE CHAIN
(a) Methods
Fieldwork was conducted in Spring 2010 in Nepal by the
author and a Nepali translator/research assistant. A set of
85 field interviews informs this study. 3 In the first stage of
research, 16 informant interviews were conducted in Kath-
mandu (the capital city) and Ilam district using an explora-
tory, informal conversational interview format (Patton,
2001). The second and third stages focused exclusively on
upstream actors. In the second stage, 20 semi-structured
guided interviews were conducted with farming (15) and labor-
ing (5) households. To start, the interviews used a short list of
questions (the ‘‘guide”) that were based on findings in the first
stage. An emergent, iterative approach was then used such
that once a topic was mentioned in an interview, it was
included as a question in subsequent interviews (Patton,
2001). A full interview guide consisting of a list of questions 4
emerged inductively through this process. It elicited informa-
tion from participants regarding the livelihood factors and
institutions they deemed relevant to their well being and
how these factors had changed over time.
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and the respondents were hard to identify in the densely
forested, mountainous terrain, snowball sampling methods
were used in this and the next stage. Informants in the first
stage suggested a few key households. These respondents, in
turn, suggested other households, who then suggested others.
Suggestions that permitted inclusion of hard-to-reach groups,
such as landless laborers, female-headed households, and tri-
bal households, were followed with a view to reflecting the
demographic and ethnic distribution in the region.
In the third stage, a quantitative survey was conducted with
30 households in order to measure the factors identified in the
second stage. Quantitative data and findings are discussed in a
separate policy paper (Mohan, 2013). Data from the second
stage and, to a lesser extent, the first stage, form the backbone
for the analysis in this paper. Analysis was conducted using
Grounded Theory methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) deployed
using QSR NVivo 9 software.
Research was conducted largely in three villages in Ilam,
namely Sundarepani, Kolbung, and Sankhejung. Criteria for
selection included the importance of village production in
gross district output as well as the presence of both organic
and conventionally certified production. A few additional
interviews were held in other villages including Borboté (Fik-
kal), Daragoun, Jasbiri, Horcoté, Iroté, and Kanyam.
(b) Input–output, territoriality, and governance aspects of the
tea value chain
The tea sector in Nepal connects thousands of small-scale
farmers to millions of discerning tea consumers worldwide.
Unlike tea grown to the south and west, which is largely
grown on plantations and processed according to cut–tear-
and-curl (CTC) methods, orthodox tea production in Nepal
is concentrated in the east, in Ilam district as well as neighbor-
ing Dhankuta and Panchthar districts, in the lush foothills of
the Himalaya, just across the border from India’s famous Dar-
jeeling tea gardens. 5 For the remainder of the paper, unless
noted otherwise, ‘‘tea” refers to orthodox tea grown by these
farmers. Although the roots of tea production in Ilam stretch
back to the 1860s, when the first tea seeds were planted, it
wasn’t until the 1960s and 70s that small-scale farmers started
planting their own tea plots (Rana, 2007). In 2009/10, these
farmers produced 1,425 tons of tea on 4,987 hectares 6 of land,
most of which was exported to India and overseas.
The Nepali orthodox tea value chain typically starts when a
smallholder farmer buys a tea seedling from a government
nursery. Inputs including fertilizers and pesticides are applied
and five years later, the farmer hires laborers to pluck the tea
leaf. It is then transported by the laborer, farmer, or a local
truck or horse to the processing factory. The factory grades
and processes the tea leaf, and then sells it to a buyer. There
are two kinds of buyers: on the one hand, there are buyers
who will accept almost any quality of tea, such as Nepali
and Indian buyers. On the other hand are premium buyers
that require compliance with food safety and quality rules,
including European wholesalers and retailers. The factory sells
the processed tea to one of these buyers, who blends and sells
it to a retailer. At the retail store, it is bought by consumers.
Between each node, the tea leaf is transported and stored.
This input–output structure of the tea value chain is shown
visually in Figures 1 and 2, which correspond to the conven-
tional and organic threads of the chain respectively. As is evi-
dent from casual observation, the organic value chain is more
streamlined than the conventional chain. However, the pattern
of industry concentration has an hourglass shape in bothcases, with a large number of upstream farmers, a few proces-
sors and traders in the middle, and many retailers and con-
sumers. International trade in conventional tea is dominated
by a handful of large global agri-food firms such as Unilever,
who buy tea at auctions, blend it, and retail it via brands such
as Twinings or Lipton’s. Organic tea, on the other hand, is
generally sold relatively directly to small-scale retailers in
developed countries. The tea value chain is buyer-driven,
and the conventional and organic threads are coordinated
through spot and captive governance respectively. The lead
firms in the high-quality segment of the tea market are special-
ized retailers or wholesalers in developed countries; while in
the low-quality segment, international tea blenders use auc-
tions, including in India, and exert little control over upstream
production (Herath & Weersink, 2008; Larsen, unpublished;
Loconto, 2012). Power in the Nepali segment is centralized
in the 20 large- and medium-sized factories 7 processing and
exporting orthodox tea leaf in Nepal (USAID, 2011) whose
production ranged from 10 to 800 megatons of made tea. Vil-
lages in Nepal had one, or at most two, such factories nearby;
each factory thus had a virtual monopoly, capturing all the
supply in the region. The producers who grew the tea, on
the other hand, were numerous, relatively poor, and small in
scale. More than 7,000 tea farming households toil on small-
scale plots in Nepal (NTCDB – National Tea, 2009), average
individual incomes in Ilam were US$1344, 8 and in our sample,
the average farm size was 0.77 hectares.4. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AMIDST THE TEA
FIELDS
These input–output, territorial, and governance characteris-
tics of the Nepali tea value chain intersected with the institu-
tional context at each node of the chain. For the sake of
analytical clarity, the rest of this paper focuses on this intersec-
tion at the farmer node of the chain. 9 Interviews with small-
scale farmers revealed a set of institutions that framed their
livelihood efforts. Their testimonies affirmed that institutions
used for vertical governance of the chain, such as standards
and grading rules, were relevant for their livelihoods. Yet
other local rules and informal norms guided their behavior.
In order to understand how upgrading induced a process of
institutional change, we first need to comprehend these rules
in depth. For that reason, we will now consider a static view
of the institutions governing the production of tea by farmers
in the rolling hills of Ilam, Nepal.
(a) A snapshot of institutions at the farmer node of the tea value
chain
The ‘‘rules of the game”, in the case of tea farming in Nepal,
can be roughly grouped into three categories. Chain governance
institutionswere set by downstream actors to control the flowof
product, information, and finance. Labor institutions set out
the ways in which farmers could access workers for their fields.
Finally, financial institutions affected farmers’ access to capital.
Several other elements made up the institutional environment
of the farmer: informal norms guided their valuation of differ-
ent livelihood options, organizations provided support, and
they had pre-existing livelihood strategies. The rest of this sec-
tion explores each of these elements in more detail.
(i) Chain governance institutions
In each village, the local factory told farmers how tea was to
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Figure 1. The conventional Nepal orthodox tea value chain.
56 WORLD DEVELOPMENTstandards; payment modalities; and grading rules. In the first
category were certification schemes specifying, inter alia,
how much leaf was to be plucked from each bush and how
much chemical use was permitted. In Ilam, each village had
only one local factory, which accepted tea produced according
to one or more standards. Two such standards will be exam-
ined in depth in this paper: the Code of Conduct, a
domestically-driven set of voluntary rules for tea production
and processing; and Organic certification. 10
Payment frequency rules set out when farmers could expect
to be paid for the tea they delivered, which could be monthly,
every other month, quarterly, or annually. Crucially, each fac-
tory had a system of rules for the grading of tea. When a
farmer dropped off tea leaf at the factory, the manager classi-
fied it as either A-grade, high-quality tea that was paid the
standard rate, or B-grade, lower-quality tea, which was paid
a lower rate or not at all. 11 Yet it was the factory that decided
which tea made the grade.
(ii) Labor institutions
The labor institutions farmers described as most relevant to
their own livelihoods were payment modality, allocation rules,
and availability rules. Workers were paid either a piece (per
kg) or time (daily) rate. Daily rates ranged from US$0.80 to
$1.61, and piece rates ranged from US$0.09/kg to $0.17/kg,
but were virtually fixed in each village. Labor was allocated
through customary obligations (i.e. landlord–tenant relations),
by verbal contract from one season to next, through thecommunity labor sharing system (‘‘porma”), by the discretion
of mobile labor groups, or on a spot market. The last two
modes of labor hiring were preferred by laborers, and were
used particularly when labor was scarce and wielded market
power. However, they were problematic for farmers, who
found that these modalities led to difficulties in accessing labor
at the right time, when the quality of the tea leaf was at its
peak. A majority of respondents described acute labor scarcity
as a problem. This shortage arose in part from increased out-
migration of young men, often to jobs in the Middle East.
(iii) Financial institutions
Financial institutions, including banks and microcredit
groups, constrained and assisted farmers by setting out rules
for access to loans, loan forgiveness, and interest rates.
(iv) Informal norms
The informal norms of market participants conditioned
what was feasible for farmers. Norms about gender, the valu-
ation of the future, and environmental awareness particularly
influenced decision-making. Women were often responsible
for coordinating field practices, including coordinating labor
and inputs, yet men were responsible for participating in coop-
erative training sessions. Those training sessions disseminated
norms about the future that influenced how farmers evaluated
non-financial benefits from upgrading.
Informal norms also existed regarding the acceptable level
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Figure 2. The organic export Nepal orthodox tea value chain.
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of risk, farmers and their organizations were more willing to
experiment with new production methods. Social convention
demanded that parents send children and youth away to
school.
(v) Organizations
The activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and industry groups affected farmers’ livelihoods indirectly,
including by strengthening cooperatives, affecting informal
norms, and augmenting international demand for Nepali tea.
HOTPA (the Himalayan Orthodox Tea Producers’ Associa-
tion) was created in 1998 to represent and coordinate the inter-
ests of the factories. By 2003, several processing factories had
opened, development organizations including JICA and Win-
rock International were active in the sector, and a Tea Devel-
opment Alliance was formed to coordinate development work
in the sector. In 2006, in order to complement HOTPA’s coor-
dination role with income-generation activities, a marketing
body was created—HIMCOOP, the Himalayan Orthodox
Tea Producers’ Cooperative. The government affected multi-
ple elements of household economics, including through edu-
cation, loans, and national strikes.
(vi) Other strategies
Farmers were pursuing a variety of their own livelihood
strategies well before the product upgrading began. In reactionto risks, farmers were diversifying their livelihoods and their
crops. In reaction to shifting conventions regarding outmigra-
tion and schooling, farmers adopted all sorts of innovative
methods to access labor. In reaction to the perceived unfair-
ness of factory rules for grading, payment frequency and pric-
ing, farmers attempted to functionally upgrade by starting up
their own small processing factories or hand-dryers. Many
were sending children for higher education and a potential
office job, in the hopes of the family eventually leaving the
farm. There was also substantial emigration: male household
heads migrated away to earn money to send the children to
school, and then the educated children no longer wanted to
work the farm. These factors influenced the course of institu-
tional change and thus how upgrading was received in the
region. To see this in more detail, we now turn our attention
to the processes at play in Ilam in 2004, when the Code of
Conduct was introduced.
(b) Upgrading alters institutions, Part I: the CoC
The process of institutional change at the farming node of
the Nepali tea value chain began when the Tea Development
Alliance and HOTPA recognized that they would capture
more profits if they improved the reputation and quality of
Nepali tea. They thus created a Code of Conduct (CoC) dur-
ing 2004–06. The CoC is a self-enforcing, voluntary code,
modeled on ISEAL, Codex, and International Federation of
58 WORLD DEVELOPMENTOrganic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) standards. There
are four components to the CoC: respect for nature, which
requires that farmers reduce pesticide and chemical use by
25% in the first year of participation, by 50% in the second
year, and bring chemical use to zero in the third year; respect
for people, including reducing child labor 12; transparent pro-
cesses, including making factory sales more open for farmers;
and assured quality, including encouraging the plucking of
high-quality tea leaf (‘‘two leafs and a bud” from each bush).
In creating the CoC and implementing it, they instigated a
process of product upgrading.
The CoC scheme was implemented at a field level by partic-
ipating factories with NGO assistance. Two aspects of the
standard were emphasized in implementation: the reduction
in chemical use and plucking higher-quality leaf. Factories
were tasked with creating a separate processing line for CoC
tea and paying farmers a US$0.04 premium per kg of CoC
tea sold; an auditor was hired to inspect compliance with the
standard; trainings were provided by NGOs and development
agencies; farmers kept record books; they reduced pesticide
and fertilizer use; and factories stamped tea with the CoC
logo.
The creation of the CoC in turn created a new set of liveli-
hood choices for farmers. Farmers had the option of partici-
pating in the CoC, and indeed some altered their livelihood
strategies and opted into the upgrading process. As concerns
farm-level practice, the new strategy notably required a reduc-
tion in the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers, increased
record-keeping, and participation in training sessions and
cooperatives.
The new strategies gave rise to new organizational forms in
the value chain. The CoC induced the formation of, firstly, a
coordinated network of value chain actors wherein farmers,
factories, buyers, and other actors exchanged information,
product, and payment to support their trade in tea. Secondly,
NGOs and development agencies provided input into the
upgrading process, particularly through training sessions,
and in the process helped increase national expertise in tea
production and in rural organizing. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, and thirdly, the CoC strengthened cooperatives. Nepali
NGO Teasec provided trainings to the cooperatives in organi-
zation, ecological agriculture, and the CoC components, with
support from donor development agencies.
These three organizational forms in turn acted to change
norms and informal conventions. As noted above, NGO train-
ing encouraged farmers to consider the impact of their deci-
sions on long-term soil fertility and sales, and this shifted
norms regarding sustainable farming. This was reflected in
how several respondents spoke about the need to improve
the fertility of the land for future generations. As one respon-
dent put it, ‘‘We are doing this for the next generation. For
our children’s children, so they don’t face hard times in the
future.” [Farmer, Sudung, Sundarepani]
During interviews, respondents were asked to reflect back
on the livelihood outcomes from the CoC. They recalled the
extensive record keeping and training requirements of the ini-
tiative, and noted that they had been proud that their tea was
‘‘sustainable” and was selling overseas, but were skeptical
about the benefits they received. In most households, tea pro-
duction per hectare fell in the months after the CoC’s restric-
tions on chemical fertilizers and pesticides were imposed. This
short-term drop in productivity stemmed from low producer
capacity along with a shortage of field-level technical assis-
tance on the use of organic fertilizer and pesticides.
Factories faced significant difficulties in marketing CoC tea
to overseas buyers who were not familiar with the nationalscheme. As a result, in virtually all the cases, they failed to
deliver the promised price premium to farmers. Several facto-
ries stopped using the CoC scheme, that is, they stopped run-
ning a segregated CoC production line and told farmers not to
bother separating CoC and non-CoC leaf.
The CoC’s elaborate rules of participation, low productiv-
ity, and absence of price premiums bode badly for farmer
livelihoods. Farmers took to disobeying the strictures of the
CoC by using chemical pesticides and fertilizers, making
excuses to the factory when confronted. The scheme gradually
faded into obscurity: less than 15% of our sample was still
using the CoC in 2010. Although the CoC did not generate
the hoped-for financial gains for farmers or factories, it did
improve capacity, including in ecological farming techniques,
collective organizing, expert training, and operating multiple
production lines. Indeed, one informant described the Tea
Development Alliance as a mother that gave birth to a baby,
the CoC, which in turn gave birth to organic upgrading, to
which we now turn.
(c) Upgrading alters institutions, Part II: Organic
In reaction to the shortcomings of the CoC upgrading pro-
cess and the burgeoning market in organic tea, in 2008 several
factories investigated opportunities to convert to organic pro-
duction. Organic certification is conferred on factories and
cooperatives by an external certifying agency if they comply
with the requirements of the international binding organic
standard, notably that they have not used any chemicals on
the farm for three consecutive years. Although certification
was conferred on the cooperative, the produce of its members
was certified by association, and indeed field-level testing and
implementation were done at the member level. Using their
own financial resources and those of overseas donors, tea fac-
tories in Ilam encouraged cooperatives to convert to organic
production, along with their farmers.
Many farmers decided to convert to organic via coopera-
tives, particularly on the basis of promises from the factory
that organic production would garner higher prices and high
future demand. The new livelihood strategy was more labor
and planning intensive: households spent many hours making
organic pesticides and fertilizers and seeking out labor. There
was qualitative evidence that some households changed their
livelihood strategies in reaction to conversion by reducing
their financial and human investment in alternative occupa-
tions and investing more in the farm and the organic project,
but the survey found limited quantitative evidence for a reduc-
tion in diversification. Both qualitative and quantitative data
made clear, however, that organic farmers had more livestock
assets and were more indebted. This indicates that conversion
involved a more capital-intensive livelihood strategy in which
investments were made in the hope of future gains.
Organic upgrading also altered the organizations involved in
tea production. Factories and local NGO experts facilitated
conversion, with the help of overseas organic certifiers, and
development agencies were relatively less important. Factories
hired Nepali experts developed in the previous cycle of change
to provide training sessions through the cooperatives, and they
hired the same consultant to audit participating farmers. At
the same time, the terms of membership in the cooperative
became very important for farmers wishing to obtain an
organic premium. One farmer spoke critically of the ‘‘old
guard” members in the local cooperative, lambasting the high
entrance fees required to join and the politics in obtaining
membership, while the factory refused to get involved in
farmer-cooperative disputes.
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the villages. Pride, environmental, and health sustainability,
and long-term prospects became important ways farmers eval-
uated their own livelihoods. Converting farmers increasingly
saw tea farming as a viable way of life in the future, and indeed
were empowered by the connection to overseas trade, foreign
visitors, and improved knowledge about organic farming tech-
niques. As one respondent put it, their tea ‘‘is earning not only
a good price; it is also generating pride.” [farmer, Kolbung]
Others said the market for tea in the long term was organic,
and so it was necessary to convert. At the same time, a culture
of surveillance arose in many certified areas given that one
farmers’ transgression of the organic rules would threaten
the market access of all the farmers in the area.
This process produced livelihood outcomes for participating
farmers that differed from those of non-organic farmers. As
noted in Section 3(b), the research method asked farmers
which livelihood factors were relevant to them, gathered more
in-depth qualitative data, and then measured the same factors.
This process generated the following evidence on the liveli-
hood outcomes that farmers deemed relevant and how they
were affected by the upgrading and subsequent institutional
change process.
Conversion to organic farming increased the prices received
by farmers. Organic farmers received, on average, NRs40 per
kg of tea sold in first flush of 2010, while conventional farmers
received on average a lower NRs22. Change over time was dif-
ferent for the two livelihood strategies, and in favor of organic
farmers: the change in pay per kg of tea in 2005–2010 was a
positive NRs6.65 for organic tea, while prices had decreased
by NRs1.42 for conventional farmers. The two groups also
experienced different degrees of price volatility: the conven-
tional group experienced prices that fluctuated 38% on aver-
age, while the organic farmers saw just 20% price volatility
over the same time. Consistently high, and more stable,
organic prices were an important livelihood benefit, and can
be explained by the fact that the standard was well aligned
with downstream market demand, it successfully conveyed
downstream demand preferences to upstream producers, and
there was more finance available to the factory to smooth
short-term cash flow issues.
Affirming qualitative evidence on the matter, the productiv-
ity of organic farmers in the sample was lower, at just 2.3 kg
per hectare per year, than conventional farmers, who on aver-
age had 5.9 kg/hec/yr. These productivity outcomes depended
on the institutional conditions in each subvillage. In villages
where organizations were stronger, training was more infor-
mative for field-level practice and so productivity, quality,
and profits tended to be higher. In locations where local norms
supported early adoption of innovation, farmers were more
likely to adopt new standards and experiment until they
yielded benefits.
On average, organic farming was less profitable. Profit is
defined here as short-term marginal revenue (the price paid
by the factory per kg) minus marginal cost (the per-unit
expenses of production) times total production, as reported
by the household head. Although organic farmers earned
more average profit per kg for the tea they grew (NRs9 as
opposed to NRs5.6 in 2010), because their productivity was
lower, their total average profit per year was lower. In 2009,
for example, the total average profit of organic farmers was
NRs9,200 as opposed to NRs15,700 for conventional farmers.
These profit figures arose in part because of the different cost
structures. Costs associated with tea production included, for
nonorganic farmers, fertilizers, pesticides, labor for plucking,
labor for pruning, own work time, and transportation. Fororganic farmers, costs included own labor time for coordina-
tion, collecting organic pesticide ingredients, making organic
pesticides and fertilizers, as well as the cost of hired labor
plucking and pruning time. Organic farmers pointed out that
they experienced increased stress from the increased time
and coordination required for production according to the
new standard. For example, during an interview in Kolbung
village, one female farmer described hours of collecting plants
to produce organic fertilizers and pesticides, and the pressure
to find extra laborers. She said,
when I’m sleeping, I think, I’m doing such hard work, when will I get
the profit from all this? I think when [the price is] NRs200! Sometimes
the production is low because of the sun, then because of labor, and. . ..
Some days ago I opened this drum to apply pesticide, and I got a head-
ache, the smell was so strong.
The benefits of upgrading were reduced by how the high
labor intensity of organic production intersected with rigid
labor institutions and shortages. Wage rates were social rules
and didn’t adjust upward to meet the increased demand. Other
livelihood strategies, namely outmigration, reduced the labor
supply. In villages where the labor shortage was more acute,
farmers were less able to mobilize the increased labor required
for organic conversion and were thus less likely to benefit from
upgrading. Farms seemed to prosper under the organic
scheme if they had more family members, more family work-
ing the land, had a smaller farm, if they used a labor exchange
system, had laborers living on the land, or had found a way of
securing guaranteed laborers in advance.
There were higher supervision costs under the organic
scheme. Under the conventional standard, laborers could be
paid on a per-kg basis, and if they plucked large quantities
of poor quality, that could still be sold. Under the organic
standard, such low-quality leaf would not garner full price
under the factory grading institutions, and so laborers had
to be paid according to a daily rate that incentivized good-
quality plucking. Unfortunately, such a time-based payment
modality demanded intense supervision to prevent labor shirk-
ing, and the increased supervision time had its opportunity
costs.
Several other financial aspects of tea farming affected house-
hold livelihoods. Farmers’ understanding of the prosperity of
their farm extended to how insulated they were from risks such
as drought, strikes (bandhs), and suddenly low prices. The evi-
dence on how organic upgrading affected this is not clear,
apart from a possible reduction of diversification. Finally, as
noted earlier, organic farmers had on average NRs10,000
more in outstanding debt than conventional farmers.
Farmers spoke often about how they felt when they went to
sell their tea, and how that feeling affected their well-being.
This reflected the process of informal norm change that took
place concurrently with upgrading. The quantitative survey
thus asked each respondent to choose the term that best
expressed how they felt when they went to sell their tea. Results
indicated that organic farmers felt less satisfied than conven-
tional farmers, but were more hopeful for the future. Organic
farmers described a sense of pride that their tea was being sold
overseas and shared optimism that their market prospects in
the future would be good. Indeed, there was a difference in
how farmers described the future market for their tea: Organic
farmers described that market as very good, while conventional
farmers described the future market just as ‘‘OK”. The long-
term health of the soil was also described as important to
well-being, and organic farmers were more confident that the
tea they were growing was good for this objective.
Outcomes from the second, organic conversion-induced
process also appeared to be giving birth to yet another cycle
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the tea grown according to organic standards on organic
markets, which highlighted that upgraded product might need
to be certified to several different standards in order to address
the requirements of several different export markets. The
process also increased knowledge regarding the importance
of the quality of the tea and that improved plucking,
transportation, and processing was needed to access niche
high-value markets. Finally, stronger cooperatives delivered
more sophisticated training that empowered farmers to
become active in organizing region and nation-wide in lobby-
ing for change in policies.5. A TYPOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN
VALUE CHAINS
This institutional history of upgrading in Ilam highlights
how, in practice, institutional change unfolded around the
CoC and Organic initiatives. The processes of change that fol-
lowed each of these upgrading initiatives seem to share com-
mon elements. Analysis of the case study data through
grounded theory methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) employed
a progressive, iterative approach which triangulated the evi-
dence from different upgrading initiatives, methods, and stake-
holders. The framework that emerged from this analysis
suggested that each upgrading initiative launched a process
of institutional change that followed a series of general phases.
This process can be summarized in a general typology, which
abstracted from this particular case study yields insights into
how institutional change works in value chains. The rest of
this section presents this typology and derives implications.
The first subsection presents and analyzes the typology, while
the second and third analyze implications for institutional and
value chain theory respectively.
(a) A proposed typology
The institutional change typology that emerged from this
research can be conceived of as an iterative cycle that operates
at each node of the chain, but for the sake of pedagogy, it is
presented here at the farmer’s node and as starting with the
upgrading decision.
The cycle begins when an actor in the chain decides to
upgrade. Institutional change theory teaches us that this first
stage depends crucially on the chain actor being able to ‘‘see”
that a new way of participating in the chain is possible, a
vision that might be enabled by seeing chains in other places
or hearing expert advice. A governance lens on this stage high-
lights how multiple actors at a controlling node in the chain
build consensus around the decision to upgrade. Their ability
to make their vision a reality depends on collective action
dynamics. Furthermore, only relatively powerful chain actors,
such as lead firms and controlling nodes, have the market
power to induce upstream actors to follow their lead. To do
so, they seek out mechanisms by which to impose their deci-
sion on upstream actors.
These efforts lead to the second stage in the typology, when
the governance of the value chain shifts as actors at the con-
trolling node in the chain impose a governance institution
on other chain actors to facilitate upgrading. Upgrading calls
for more tightly coordinated value chain interactions, and
standards can be used to impose rules that precisely define
flows of information, knowledge, and product. In the case
of the Nepali product upgrade, factory owners adopted
certification standards to govern quality improvements andinteractions in the chain. A shift in the vertical institutions that
govern the product along the value chain thus flows from the
decision to upgrade.
In the third stage of institutional change, actors at a given
node in the value chain craft new livelihood strategies in view
of the change in chain governance. They may decide to partic-
ipate in upgrading; on the other hand, the strategy phase of
the cycle may include a downgrading strategy, or a path that
is not readily explained as a change in position in the chain,
such as a diversification of livelihoods or an investment in edu-
cation. In the case of product upgrading in Ilam, some farmer-
suppliers decided to improve their production processes and
get certified, while others decided to continue to produce using
conventional methods. Still others decided on other strategies,
including leaving the tea sector entirely or diversifying to other
crops. In deciding on this strategy, actors at the node consider
not just how the chain governance has shifted, but how the
new opportunity interacts with existing livelihood strategies
and institutional constraints.
The fourth stage is characterized by the creation of new or
altered organizations. These organizations may be created in
the first phase by lead firms to build consensus, in the second
phase or third phases to implement the new governance mech-
anisms, or they may arise at the behest of less-powerful actors
to pursue success with their new set of strategies. They may
help resolve market failures, including for communication
along the chain and for technical assistance at particular
nodes. Existing organizations may experience a rebirth as
they are retooled for the purposes of participation in altered
value chains.
As these organizations take on a life of their own, and
develop their own voice and advocacy practices, and as actors
are shaped by their new strategies and organizations, the infor-
mal norms at the node of the value chain shift, marking out
the fifth stage in the cycle. This may involve the rise of a sense
of pride in the quality of the product, and the local ‘‘terroir”
for which the region has become known. It may include
increasing trust for actors at other links of the chain. As such,
informal institutions in particular places are in part the pro-
duct of the history of chain transformation, as per Neilson
and Pritchard (2009). However, as these authors also suggest,
institutions also act upon value chain governance: informal
norms that are developed through the institutional change
cycle are used by chain actors to understand their reality
and decide how to act.
This is evident in the sixth stage of our cycle, where the new
horizontal institutions, organizations, and strategies generate
a new set of livelihood outcomes. Livelihood strategies, includ-
ing upgrading plans, come up against constraining and
enabling factors in actors’ institutional environment, including
aid by organizations. Norms are important in motivating par-
ticipation in the strategy, improving performance, but also in
constituting evaluation criteria. Actors at a given node of the
value chain see the livelihood outcomes emerging from the
complex interplay of upgrading, strategies, and all the institu-
tional factors outlined in the cycle above. Indeed, these out-
comes are generated over time throughout the cycle.
However, once the outcomes from a cycle of change spurred
by upgrading become more clear to the chain actor, they also
often notice new opportunities, thereby re-launching the cycle.
The adoption of a new standard throughout the chain can
highlight a constraint to future growth, such as a shortfall in
technical knowledge, creating opportunities to profit through
the creation of institutions and organizations that provide
technical training. Efforts to capture these rents through
upgrading then launch a new cycle of change. This is
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Figure 4. Institutional change cycle in value chains.
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the Code of Conduct laid the foundations for a new cycle,
launched with upgrading to Organic. The breakdown of the
process of change according to the typology in that case is
presented in Figure 3.
Although the typology has been presented for clarity as a
single, bounded process, shown in its general form in Figure 4
above, it is better conceived of as a repeated, iterative cycle in
which outcomes beget more upgrading and institutional
change.
Furthermore, in a given case, the cycle can start at any stage,
and the direction of causation may be different. For example, a
chance event may lead to a change in an organization that in
turn encourages a shift in norms and a decision to upgrade.
More profoundly, one can see each of the ‘‘stages” as a
domain of change in itself, and the local system is made upof interactions between these domains over time within the
value chain node. Finally, while the analysis has focused on
how this process takes place at a single node, processes of
institutional change are also occurring at other nodes of the
chain; shifts in chain governance, often induced by upgrading,
tie these worlds of local change together, in a system not
unlike the ‘‘multi-dimensional, multi-layered lattices of eco-
nomic activity” of GPN theory (Henderson et al., 2002, p.
442; Lazzarini et al., 2001). The combined effect of these con-
current change processes affects subsequent cycles of change
and livelihood outcomes throughout the chain.
(b) Implications for institutional change theory
The case study and its analysis via the typology generate
empirical support for some, but not all, of the institutional
62 WORLD DEVELOPMENTtheories presented earlier. The typology affirms that an evolu-
tionary process guides adjustment as multiple cycles alter the
system over time. However, the vision of an exogenous trigger
spurring Darwinian competition does not resonate in light of
the field data. Rather, the trigger comes from within the sys-
tem, namely when value chain agents decide to change institu-
tions in order to capture rents and reduce risk. The new
institution emerged not because it is optimally suited to reduce
transaction costs, but rather because it benefitted one actor,
and since other actors could not effectively resist the change,
affirming that political economy struggles are important deter-
minants of the course of change.
As concerns the question of how and why agents step out-
side of existing constraints, this research suggests that change
agents take initiative because they see opportunities for profit.
This depends on their ability to ‘‘see” alternatives (Seo &
Creed, 2002), which in this case involved envisaging certifica-
tion schemes that could increase value-added capture. Expo-
sure to different ideas from outside the local context
(Canales, 2010) gave factory owners ideas about potential
improvements they could undertake, while for farmers, the
practices of neighbors and NGO discourse did the same.
The model espoused by the data is thus an endogenous one
in which institutions do condition agents, but where agents
then re-affect institutions—that is, institutions and agents co-
evolve.
The second ideal-typical institutional change scenario has
more empirical support and appears to be a superior frame-
work to analyze value chains. The profitability of reducing
chemical use and the level of knowledge of agents were akin
to quasi-parameters that gradually changed. Major parame-
ters like input or output prices didn’t change significantly;
instead, shifts in these quasi-parameters opened up rents,
which then changed the benefits from instigating change via
upgrading. As per scenarios two and three, however, upstream
value chain actors were not passive recipients of change: they
crafted strategies whose execution affected outcomes.
Finally, there appeared to be important complementarities
among sets of formal and informal institutions. For example,
the organic standard worked alongside labor payment modal-
ities and norms about sustainability. The failure of a given
upgrade may thus be at least partially attributed to constraints
to the establishment of complementary institutions elsewhere
in the system (Mohan, 2014).
(c) Implications for upgrading theory
The analysis in this paper has suggested that deciding to
upgrade to a higher quality thread of the value chain is a par-
ticular sort of livelihood strategy. Yet as far as terms go,
‘‘value chain upgrading” obscures the reality of livelihood
strategies. It incorrectly presumes that such a strategy will
eventually lead to functional and/or inter-chain upgrading
and an improvement in market position (Ponte et al., 2014).
It only sees that aspect of the strategy that overlaps with the
value chain: for example, a move to reduce quantity supplied
into the chain is only seen as that, and is labeled as ‘‘down-
grading” (Ponte & Ewert, 2009), rather than being seen as part
of a process of diversification or emigration. Perhaps most
problematically from the perspective of this article, the
upgrading lens obscures the broader institutional context in
which livelihood strategies sink or swim, including how
upgrading strategies are born as part of broader livelihood
strategies, how they are constrained by intransigent local rules,
or how they are made possible by organizations that arethemselves the product of earlier livelihood strategies. One
implication of the research in this paper is thus that a broader
livelihood strategy lens, embedded in an understanding of
institutions, is a more comprehensive way to understand
change in value chains.
The typology presented above stresses that the welfare
impacts of upgrading emerge as the cumulative result of how
upgrading interacts with institutions over time. There is noth-
ing in the typology nor in the data that suggests that this pro-
cess always yields outcomes that are efficient and improve
welfare. Indeed, in the case study, some upgrading farmers
experienced adverse impacts on selected livelihood metrics.
Rather than describing welfare effects as ‘‘social upgrading”
or ‘‘social downgrading” (Barrientos et al., 2011), or
emphasizing how ‘‘downgrading” to a less demanding thread
of the chain can be beneficial (Ponte & Ewert, 2009), this
paper instead finds the notion of ‘‘immiserizing upgrading”,
which hurts the actor who undertakes it, to be more informa-
tive.
In the terminology of Bhagwati (1958), and how it was
applied to a value chain context by Kaplinsky et al. (2002)
and Kaplinsky (2004), ‘‘immiserizing growth” occurs when a
country or sector increases the quantity it produces, but actu-
ally earns less profit since the price it receives per unit has gone
down. In the macroeconomic perspective of Bhagwati and
Kaplinsky, the actor has tried to improve its well-being by
changing one economic variable (here output) that it has con-
trol over: but this changed strategy has had a knock-on effect
on another variable (here price) and the intended and unin-
tended effects combine to hurt, or ‘‘immiserize”, the actor.
Likewise, immiserizing upgrading can be defined as a strategy
of a value chain actor which targets improvement in a chain-
governed livelihood factor (such as market power, position, or
price) yet has adverse implications on other livelihood factors
(such as gender, productivity, or risk) such that the net result
of the strategy is worsened welfare. In the Nepali case, farmers
upgraded to try and access better prices in the short and long
term, but upgrading led to higher labor costs, stress, and lower
productivity, all of which commiserated to reduce overall wel-
fare in some cases.
Furthermore, insofar as one welfare-reducing cycle of
change can lay the basis for subsequent welfare-improving
cycles of change, isolating the impact of a single upgrade
may be misleading. Instead, the impact of change on the adap-
tive efficiency of the economic system may be important. For
example, one respondent recounted how the local factory’s
sudden decision to stop buying tea leaf one year, and the con-
comitant adverse impacts on farmers’ livelihoods, triggered
the creation of a new cooperative. The cooperative fomented
an entrepreneurial approach which encouraged farmers to rise
to future challenges: they ‘‘learned how to learn”, seeing each
new problem as an opportunity to extend their eco-
agricultural, marketing, and organization techniques. As per
Aoki (2007), such chance moves early on in the process seem
to influence the path taken by the local economy. If this is
the case, then particular locations can ‘‘lock in” to certain tra-
jectories of economic development through path-dependent
participation in value chains.6. CONCLUSION
Participation in global value chains has been characterized
alternatively as an opportunity or as a threat to the well being
of small-scale firms in developing countries. The research pre-
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upgrade affects the welfare of the upstream poor. As in other
studies, outcomes spring in part from the certification stan-
dards that are used to govern the upgrading process. Yet this
paper suggests that upgrading is not imposed on passive vic-
tims in the south; rather, the Nepali case highlights how
upgrading interacts with local institutions, strategies, and
organizations to deliver outcomes in the short and long run.
Institutional analysis can thus help us understand impacts of
these policies and improve their development dividend.
This study yields support for endogenous theories of institu-
tional change in value chains. Exposing potential change
agents to different institutional arrangements can help to
kick-start the process of change. Future research could exam-
ine how certain such paths of change are more or less con-
ducive to positive livelihood outcomes as well as growth-
inducing future phases of change. Additional research is also
needed to consolidate the literature on immiserizing upgrading
within the broader gamut of commodity systems analysis.
Value chain upgrading can yield benefits for small-scale
firms in developing countries, and particularly so if local insti-
tutions are conducive. In our case study of the Nepali tea value
chain, the status of labor, factory, and informal institutions
conditioned whether small-scale farmers benefited from
upgrading to organic production. The typology of institu-
tional change that emerged from the field data suggests that
upgrading encourages value chain actors to craft new
livelihood strategies and organizations, which in turn con-tribute to shifts in informal norms at that node of the value
chain. The combined effect of the new institutions, strategies,
organizations, and norms is felt as livelihood outcomes for
chain participants which, in generating new profit opportuni-
ties, spur future cycles of change. One upgrading intervention
can thus trigger several cycles of institutional change that pro-
mote growth and long-term benefits. At the same time,
upgrading can yield negative livelihood impacts, at least in
the short term, in a process of immiserizing upgrading. This
lets lay theories of institutional change and value chain
upgrading which presume that these interventions can only
improve efficiency and welfare.
Heterogeneity in outcomes from upgrading can thus at least
in part be attributed to differences in the institutional setting,
and evolution, in different places. Business and development
policy-makers could thus enhance the development dividend
from upgrading by first assessing institutional constraints
and opportunities related to proposed upgrading initiatives,
and designing accompanying policies to address these
conditions. For example, in the Nepali case, firms upgrading
to organic production could have adopted policies to foster
immigration of laborers that would have helped households
harvest good-quality tea leaf to address labor constraints.
Instead of assuming that upgrading is beneficial, such a
pragmatic approach could help ensure that disadvantaged
suppliers reap the benefits of participation in global value
chains.NOTES1. While more recent work has assigned an active role to the institutional
context surrounding GVCs (Neilson & Pritchard, 2009; Herath &
Weersink, 2008; Kersting & Wollni, 2012; Ponte et al., 2014), it has
overwhelmingly focused on meso and macro-level institutions, particularly
government regulations, national policies, and organizations. Other,
micro-level local institutions mediate production in developing
countries—and as such are important to how actors at particular nodes
of the chain engage with upgrading—yet have been neglected in the GVC
literature.
2. In this they concur with research in other disciplines on the
suboptimality of a given institutional framework. The political economy
perspective of North (1990) and historical institutionalists (Immergut,
1998) stresses that the powerful can change rules for their own benefit, so
there can be institutions, and institutional change, that do not enhance
efficiency or overall societal welfare. Sociological institutionalists (Berger
& Luckmann, 1966), and equilibrium view institutionalists (Aoki, 2007),
view the existing set of institutions as one among many possible equilibria.
In the setting of the paper, this implies that upgrading can result in
suboptimal outcomes that can undermine livelihoods. More generally, as
one reviewer pointed out, there is no consensus on which institutions are
crucial to a well-operating economy; indeed, many empirical studies are of
single institutions.
3. The field data was complemented by desk research from Nepal and
elsewhere, three follow-up interviews, and a verification fieldwork phase.
4. Questions pertained to, inter alia, land holdings; household compo-
sition; amount of land planted to tea; revenue from tea; costs incurred; net
income from tea; sources of risk; degree of agricultural and occupational
diversification; mechanisms used by the household to respond to shocks;
motivation for converting to organic/CoC production; pride, confidence
in the future, and other subjective factors; education and training;cooperative membership and politics; interaction with government and
NGOs; factory practices, including frequency of payment, grading, and
rules concerning chemical usage and quality of leaf plucking; household
expenses; payments to laborers; and how revenue, income, and other
factors have changed since conversion (if applicable). The survey in the
third stage quantified a similar list of livelihood and institutional factors
through a standardized questionnaire (more information available upon
request).
5. There are two ways to process tea leaf in Nepal. The cut, tear, and curl
(CTC) method produces low-quality, easily soluble tea for tea bags. The
majority of Nepali tea leaf is grown outside Ilam district, primarily in the
terai region, and is processed using CTC methods in Nepal and India. Tea
leaf for CTC production is paid a low price per kg. The orthodox method
involves withering, rolling, and drying the tea leaf, producing a high-
quality loose leaf tea sold in tea boutiques around the world. This paper
focuses on tea leaf produced and processed in the orthodox tea sector.
This focus was adopted since the orthodox sector has been identified as a
key potential growth and development sector by development, govern-
ment, and business actors. The majority of leaf in the research area, Ilam
district, is processed using orthodox methods.
6. These figures are for combined orthodox and CTC tea. (USAID.,
2011, 15)
7. There were, in addition, several small-scale processing works that did
not export their product.
8. 2006 figures, GDP per capita PPP. (UNDP., 2009, p.149)
9. The research project set out to examine the institutions and livelihoods
of farmers, and thus by construction the treatment of labor in this paper is
limited. As such, although data was gathered from and about laborers,
64 WORLD DEVELOPMENTowing to both space constraints and the need for analytical focus it has
been analyzed so as to shed light on institutional change at the farmer
node of the value chain. Other research has examined institutions at other
nodes, notably labor (Rossi 2013).
10. Other standards which may be relevant for some parts of the chain,
at some point in time, include HACCP rules (Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points), which require record-keeping all along the chain,
including regarding farmer suppliers to each processing batch. Other
rules include the Codex Alimentarius standards for safe pesticide and
fertilizer use; EcoCert; Fair Trade; private supermarket chain rules; and
EUREPGAP rules.
11. In some cases, the farmer was told on the spot how much was A and
how much was B grade. In other cases, it was only at payment time
months later that the farmer was told how much was A and how much wasB grade. At payment time, the farmer was either paid for both A and B
grade tea on the spot; or, payment was made for A grade tea, and B grade
payment only came months later. In some cases, farmers received no
payment for B grade tea whatsoever.
12. Although the ‘‘respect for people” (including reducing child labor)
and ‘‘transparency” (opening factory books to farmers) elements were
included in the CoC, evidence from interviews suggested that these two
aspects of the Code were less operationally relevant. The reasons for this
neglect were less clear. Neither child labor nor factory secrecy was raised
as problematic issues by informants, farmers or laborers, but this does not
preclude the possibility that these phenomenon were present. This study
did not measure child labor in Ilam, and as such does not have sufficient
evidence to judge its prevalence. As such, it is unclear whether child labor,
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